First meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda 2026 – Temporary recommendations
《国际卫生条例》紧急委员会关于2026年刚果民主共和国和乌干达埃博拉本迪布焦病毒病疫情的第一次会议——临时建议
On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event.
2026年5月17日，根据《国际卫生条例（2005）》第12条第2款——确定国际关注的突发公共卫生事件，包括大流行病突发事件，世界卫生组织（世卫组织）总干事在与已知发生该事件的缔约国协商后，确定刚果民主共和国和乌干达由本迪布焦病毒引起的埃博拉疫情构成国际关注的突发公共卫生事件（全球关注卫生紧急事件），但不符合《国际卫生条例》定义的大流行病突发事件的标准。2026年5月17日发布的总干事声明还包含了对缔约国应对和准备这一事件的“世卫组织建议”。
On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC.
2026年5月19日，总干事就刚果民主共和国和乌干达本迪布焦病毒引起的埃博拉疫情召开了IHR紧急委员会第一次会议（以下简称“委员会”）。委员会的建议与总干事的决定一致，即该事件构成全球关注卫生紧急事件，但不符合疫情紧急情况的标准。委员会承认，这一流行病发生在最具挑战性的业务环境中，因此，任何应对措施都必须纳入关键的背景信息，以提高成功应对的机会。总干事考虑到委员会的意见，特此向所有缔约国提出以下临时建议，以回应并准备回应全球关注卫生紧急事件。
====
====
These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face.
这些临时建议是根据缔约国面临的与本迪布焦病毒病流行相关的公共卫生风险，针对缔约国的子集发布的。
All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment.
所有目前的世卫组织临时技术指南都可以在世卫组织网站的这一页上找到。世卫组织循证指南已经并将继续根据不断变化的形势、最新的科学证据和世卫组织风险评估进行更新。
The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR.
缔约国在执行这些临时建议时，应根据《国际卫生条例》第3条规定的原则，充分尊重人的尊严、人权和基本自由。
As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda.
截至2026年5月22日，世卫组织秘书处评估这些缔约国刚果民主共和国的风险为“非常高”，乌干达为“高”。
It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented.
委员会注意到，两个缔约国的流行病情况在流行病的严重程度和开展应对工作的背景方面有所不同。
Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented.
具体而言，截至2026年5月22日，乌干达报告了两例本迪布焦病毒病(BVD)确诊病例，两例病例的流行病学联系均可追溯到刚果民主共和国有BVD传播记录的地区。在乌干达，截至同一天，没有记录到两例确诊的BVD病例的接触者之间的进一步传播。
The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below.
此次疫情是由本迪布焦病毒（BDBV）引起的，这是一种属于正埃博拉病毒属的病毒。与引起埃博拉病毒病的埃博拉病毒不同，目前没有批准的针对本迪布焦病毒的治疗剂或疫苗。虽然候选疗法被考虑用于临床试验，并正在进行快速候选疫苗评估，但流行病的控制依赖于扩大公共卫生干预措施，如下所述。
Coordination and high-level engagement
协调和高级别参与
Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate.
根据国内法，酌情在国家或国家以下各级宣布本迪布焦病毒病（BVD）疫情为突发卫生事件。
Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance, including case identification; contact tracing; infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement; laboratory diagnostic testing, case management, and safe and dignified burials. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas.
启动国家灾害或卫生应急管理机制，并在国家元首或相关政府机构的授权下启动或建立应急行动中心，以协调政府部门、行政级别和合作伙伴的应对活动，确保高效和有效地实施和监测全面的BVD控制措施。这些措施必须包括加强监测，包括病例识别；接触追踪；感染预防和控制（IPC）、风险沟通和社区参与实验室诊断测试、病例管理以及安全和有尊严的埋葬。应在国家一级建立协调和应对机制，并在已发现BDBV的地区和有风险的地区建立国家以下一级。
Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation.
建立并维护与BVD一致的最新信号登记册（“警报”），包括其调查状态。
Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases.
建立并维护最新的疑似病例列表，包括通过综合征监测发现的病例、可能病例和确诊的BVD病例。
Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring.
建立并维护所有确诊和可能BVD病例的最新接触者名单，并在最后一次已知接触日期后监测每个接触者21天。流行病的演变和可用资源可能需要根据风险对需要识别和监测的接触者进行优先排序。
Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care.
酌情进行谈判，建立安全走廊，包括跨境走廊，以使应急人员能够安全到达受影响的社区，并使社区能够寻求适当的医疗保健。
Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here.
根据此处提供的世卫组织病例定义，通过世卫组织区域办事处的相关世卫组织IHR联络点通知世卫组织，每天发现疑似、可能和确诊的BVD病例。
Risk communication and community engagement
风险沟通及社区参与
Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices.
实施大规模的建立信任和社区参与干预措施——利用所有可信的可用沟通渠道，并与当地宗教和传统领袖以及传统治疗师密切合作——以便社区充分意识到控制措施的风险和好处，并积极主动地促进和支持病例的早期发现和早期隔离；接触者的识别和监测；以及安全和有尊严的埋葬方式。
Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
加强社区的认识、参与和参与，以建立和加强信任，包括查明和解决可能妨碍社区充分参与应对工作的文化规范和信仰；并将干预措施和社区反馈纳入更广泛的应对措施，以满足民众的需求，特别是在刚果民主共和国东部各省旷日持久的人道主义危机背景下。
Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner.
就公共卫生措施的基本原理对社区领导人进行培训，包括隔离病例、监测接触者以及以有尊严、非污名化和非惩罚性的方式安全埋葬。
Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures.
激活地方网络，包括社区卫生工作者、红十字会志愿者和其他值得信赖的社区行为者，以促进保护行为；促进早期发现和转诊疑似BVD病例；支持接触者追踪活动；收集和传递社区反馈，以提高公共卫生措施的接受度。
Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support.
通过提供食物、水、通信、财政和心理社会支持，使人们能够遵守与实施控制措施相关的行动限制。
Surveillance and laboratory
监测和实验室
Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through:
加强监测和实验室能力，分散到有BDBV检测记录的第一个国家以下行政级别（如省）及其邻近的第一个国家以下行政级别，方法是：
Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD;
在每个卫生区内和被确定为具有引入BVD高风险的邻近卫生区内设立专门的监测和应对小组；
Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths;
积极发现病例，加强对不明原因疾病或死亡群的社区监测；
The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection;
在发现后24小时内调查“警报”；
The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers;
扩大和加强RT-PCR实验室及时检测BDBV的能力，包括建立安全样本采集协议、样本转诊途径、实验室工作人员生物安全培训；
The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards.
应考虑实验室能力的分散，以允许快速周转时间并支持患者护理以及可能进行的任何临床试验。野外实验室应按照生物安保和生物安全标准设置。可以考虑近点护理测定，前提是其性能根据当前RT-PCR标准进行验证。
NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV).
注意：GeneXpert平台无法检测本迪布焦病毒（BDBV）。
Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for.
在最后一次已知接触日期后的21天内，确定并监测疑似、可能和确诊BVD病例的接触者的健康状况。应每天评估和记录被监测的接触者的健康状况。任何出现与BVD相符症状的接触者都应进行评估、隔离、检测和护理。
Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities.
建立机制，监测与接触者追踪活动绩效相关的指标演变情况。
Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care
卫生机构和护理环境中的感染预防和控制
Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision.
加强预防医院感染的措施，包括系统绘制卫生设施地图、建立和传播分诊方案、有针对性的IPC干预措施以及持续监测和监督。
Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
为医护人员提供持续的IPC培训，包括正确使用个人防护设备（PPE）。
Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay.
向卫生机构提供充足的适当个人防护设备，以确保其工作人员的安全和保护，为及时支付其工资提供资源，并酌情提供危险津贴。
Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions.
为卫生工作者建立接触后报告和接受评估的渠道，并获得心理社会支持，并在可能的情况下，在同情使用或临床试验下进行接触后预防。必须调查所有卫生工作者的职业暴露，以便立即采取纠正措施。
Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc.
考虑通过培训社区领导人来建设社区IPC能力，并强调手部卫生不仅有助于控制BVD疫情，还能降低同一地区其他传染病的传播风险。应在关键场所促进手部卫生，如学校、教堂、酒吧、市场、当地集会场所、入境点等。
Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care
患者转诊途径和获得安全和优化的重症监护
Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care.
为疑似、可能和确诊病例建立专门的BVD隔离和治疗中心或单位，位于或靠近有BDBV检测记录的区域，配备足够的受过专门培训和装备的工作人员，以实施优化的重症支持性护理。
Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment.
以人道和以病人为中心的方式，建立将疑似BVD患者安全转移到专门的卫生保健机构进行隔离、评估和治疗的协议。这包括训练有素的救护队、通知接收医疗机构的机制、在转移过程中应用适当的IPC预防措施以及车辆和设备的净化协议。
Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles.
根据生物安全原则，制定医疗废物处理和处置协议。
Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes.
建立幸存者后续方案，包括临床护理、咨询、精液检测和性健康咨询，酌情提供避孕套，以及心理社会支助和减少耻辱的方案。
Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services.
维持一揽子基本卫生服务，包括为其安全运作提供IPC设备。这至少包括疟疾诊断和治疗以及妇幼保健服务。
Safe and dignified burials
安全和有尊严的埋葬
Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations.
制定规程，确保葬礼和埋葬由训练有素的人员进行，规定家庭和文化习俗的存在，并符合相关的国家法律和条例。
Operations, supplies and logistics
业务、供应和后勤
Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial.
建立后勤支持，以维持个人防护设备、诊断、治疗和其他医疗商品、IPC材料（包括安全掩埋）的强大供应管道。
Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events
边境卫生、国际旅行和群众聚集活动
Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas.
通过共同边界国家之间的安排，加强对陆路过境点和边境地区的监视。
Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.
根据国家法律法规采取措施，防止疑似、可能和确诊的BVD病例及其接触者进行国际旅行，除非旅行是适当医疗后送的一部分。
Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements.
防止疑似、可能或确诊的BVD病例的遗体跨境流动，除非通过双边安排授权。
Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.
在所有入境点——机场、港口和地面过境点——实施出境筛查，至少包括一份问卷，包括潜在接触BVD的历史、体温测量，如果发烧，由训练有素并配备个人防护装备的人员对BVD风险进行深入评估。任何被确定患有与BVD相符的疾病的旅行者都不应被允许旅行，除非旅行是适当医疗后送的一部分。
Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.
通过世卫组织区域办事处的相关世卫组织《国际卫生条例》联络点向世卫组织报告所采取的任何国际交通相关措施的执行情况。
Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.
考虑推迟群众集会，直到BVD传播中断。
Research and development of medical countermeasures
医疗对策研究与发展
Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to:
在可行的情况下，与研究伙伴和国际机构合作：
Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field.
定义稳健的实验室策略，紧急实施PCR诊断的头对头比较研究，以验证或失效PCR平台（Radione®）目前在该领域使用。
Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines.
实施经伦理批准、科学可靠的临床试验，以推进用于治疗和暴露后预防以及疫苗的候选疗法的开发和使用。
Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.
为支持研究，建立快速有效的国家监管和伦理审查、社区参与、药物警戒（如适用）、数据共享和公平获取安排。
As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”.
截至2026年5月22日，世卫组织秘书处评估区域风险为“高”。
Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels.
建立与国家以下各级相衔接的国家协调机制。
Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts.
迅速提高应对BVD病例的准备状态，包括在卫生设施中建立主动监测，零报告；加强对不明原因死亡群的社区监测；建立对有资格检测BVD的实验室的访问；提高卫生工作者对BVD的认识；对卫生工作者进行IPC预防措施培训；建立快速反应小组，调查和管理BVD患者及其接触者；建立接触者识别和监测机制。
Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation.
建立国家参考实验室及时安全地进行BDBV检测以及相关差异检测的能力。作为外部质量保证实施的一部分，可以考虑将其运送到国际参考实验室进行实验室间比较。
Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.
必要时开展国际接触者追踪行动，包括从航空公司和其他运输业务获取信息；确定与国际航行中运输工具相关的联系人，并与已知这些联系人最终目的地的缔约国进行沟通。
Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.
在居住在边境地区的社区和入境点，包括与有记录的BDBV检测到缔约国有直接联系的机场和港口，加强风险沟通和社区参与活动，并向公众提供关于BVD流行病和降低接触风险措施的准确和最新信息。
Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms.
通过与BVD“警报”管理相关的模拟演习，包括跨境演习，应对BVD的演习安排；样品转诊；启动快速反应小组和机制。
Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.
为支持研究，建立快速有效的国家监管和伦理审查、社区参与、药物警戒（如适用）、数据共享和公平获取安排。
Border health and international travel
边境健康和国际旅行
Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.
向旅行者提供关于BVD疫情的准确和最新信息以及降低暴露风险的措施，包括不鼓励前往有BDBV检测记录的地区。
Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up.
通过共同边界国家之间的安排，加强对陆路过境点的监视。这包括建立协调机制，检测和评估患有不明原因发热疾病的旅行者；以及及时分享关于已经或可能已经越境的联系人的信息，从而能够持续开展后续行动。
Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection.
在与有BDBV检测记录的边境地区相邻的边境地区预先放置个人防护设备、其他IPC材料、样本收集工具包、病例调查表和安全埋葬用品。
Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures.
在机场和港口启动卫生应急计划，让运输运营商参与进来，根据既定协议，检测、评估和管理来自有记录的BDBV检测、表现出与BVD相符的症状的缔约国的旅行者，并确定他们的接触者。这需要训练有素的人员、转诊机制和IPC措施的应用。
Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.
与运输工具运营商协调，以便在抵达之前及时向相关当局通报船上运输工具上的任何疑似BVD病例，并确定与国际航行中运输工具相关的联系人。在确定此类联系人时，在适用的情况下，将个人详细情况通报被称为这些联系人最终目的地的缔约国。
At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.
在发布这些临时建议时，既不建议暂停与记录有BDBV检测记录的缔约国的航班或水路航线，也不建议拒绝来自这些缔约国的旅行者和运输工具入境。
Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.
通过相关的世卫组织《国际卫生条例》联络点向世卫组织报告所采取的任何国际交通相关措施的执行情况。
Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts.
将发现疑似或确诊的BVD病例、其接触者或不明原因死亡群体视为突发卫生事件，包括根据国内法正式宣布。这包括在24小时内调查任何此类事件，并通过建立病例隔离和管理；建立明确的诊断；并进行接触者的识别和监测。
Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.
根据此处提供的世卫组织病例定义，立即通过世卫组织区域办事处的相关世卫组织IHR联络点通知世卫组织任何疑似、可能或确诊的BVD病例。
In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.
在存在BVD病例的情况下，适用对有BDBV检测记录的缔约国的临时建议。
As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”.
截至2026年5月22日，世卫组织秘书处评估这些缔约国的风险为“低”。
Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care.
安排检测、评估、报告和管理来自有BDBV检测记录的地区的不明原因发热性疾病的旅行者。这些措施包括但不限于向公共和私人卫生保健机构（包括旅行诊所）和全科医生传播BVD病例的定义；确定进行BDBV检测的实验室；确定允许安全评估和临床护理的隔离设施。
Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure.
向在国际上部署人员应对BVD流行病的非政府组织和其他实体提供关于风险的信息、最大限度地降低暴露风险的措施以及管理潜在暴露的建议。
Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases.
准备为接触过BVD病例的国民（如卫生工作者）的撤离和遣返提供便利。
Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.
向公众提供关于BVD疫情的准确和最新信息以及降低暴露风险的措施，包括不鼓励前往有BDBV检测记录的地区。
Border health and international travel
边境健康和国际旅行
Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.
向旅行诊所、其他卫生机构和专业人员提供有关BVD疫情的准确和最新信息，并不鼓励前往有BDBV检测记录的地区。
Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival.
在入境点向入境旅客提供信息，说明如果他们在抵达后21天内出现与BVD相符的症状应采取的措施。
Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.
与运输部门协调，包括运输和入境点运营商，及时管理疑似BVD病例，包括在抵达前进行沟通，如果该人在船上；以及识别他们在船上运输工具上的联系人。在确定此类联系人时，在适用的情况下，将个人详细情况通报被称为这些联系人最终目的地的缔约国。
At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.
在发布这些临时建议时，既不建议暂停来自记录有BDBV检测记录的缔约国的航班，也不建议拒绝来自这些缔约国的旅客和运输工具入境。
Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.
通过相关的世卫组织《国际卫生条例》联络点向世卫组织报告所采取的任何国际交通相关措施的执行情况。
Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.
根据此处提供的世卫组织病例定义，立即通过世卫组织区域办事处的相关世卫组织IHR联络点通知世卫组织任何疑似、可能或确诊的BVD病例。
In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.
在存在BVD病例的情况下，适用对有BDBV检测记录的缔约国的临时建议。
Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations
报告临时建议的执行情况
Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response.
利用世卫组织将提供的标准化工具和渠道，每季度向世卫组织报告这些临时建议的执行情况和相关挑战，同时也允许监测进展情况和查明国家应对措施中的差距。
