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On Oct. 25, 2025, Europe's Sentinel‑2 satellite mission captured a striking image of the Planchón-Peteroa volcanic complex, located on the border between Chile and Argentina, emitting a plume of ash and volcanic gas rising roughly 1,970 feet (600 meters) above the crater. The ash plume drifted north‐northwest initially and then, under changing wind conditions, veered eastward across the Argentine side. The Sentinel-2 satellites, developed and operated by the European Space Agency, use high-resolution optical imaging to monitor land surfaces, coastal zones and inland waters. There are currently three Sentinel-2 satellites in orbit — Sentinel-2A, Sentinel-2B and Sentinel-2C, which launched in 2015, 2017 and 2024, respectively. They're part of the European Union's Copernicus Earth-observation program, whose first satellite (Sentinel-1A) launched in 2014. The Planchón-Peteroa complex sits in the Andes mountain range, at a high altitude in a region dominated by snow‐covered peaks and volcanic terrain. Because the Planchón-Peteroa volcanic complex is remote, rugged and spans two countries, satellite imagery plays a vital role in monitoring volcanic activity, ash dispersal and potential impacts on air pollution, local communities and the environment. The snow-covered ground enhances the visibility of the ash plume as it drifts across the landscape, allowing for better tracking by the ESA satellite. With the ash crossing from Chile into Argentina, the image shows how volcanic events do not respect national boundaries — and international monitoring systems like Copernicus are key. You can learn more about the European Space Agency and the Copernicus program.

2025-12-12 林雪霞 航空 英-中

Every student with autism is different, but as the number of diagnoses continues to grow and many are included in general education classrooms, teachers and school leaders can implement certain principles to ensure students with autism thrive. Among the best practices schools can take are direct and multisensory instruction, role-playing and modeling behaviors, employing a variety of communication strategies, and being sensitive to overstimulating situations. Explicit instruction with step-by-step guidance in carrying out assignments, paired with multiple ways to digest those instructions — spanning visual, auditory and even kinesthetic cues — are the first concepts that come to mind for Delancy Allred, public policy manager at the Autism Society of America. Students with autism may also benefit from visual supports like schedules, charts and diagrams can be very helpful, such as “if-then” boards for younger children that lay out a scenario in the form of “if this is done, then this will be the result or reward” to provide incentives to finish an assignment or behave well, said Allred. The portion of students with autism who qualify for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act increased by nearly 10% between 2022 and 2023, according to a The Advocacy Institute analysis of U.S. Department of Education Department data for students ages 5-21. A 2025 report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that 1 in 31 8-year-olds were identified with autism in 2022. That’s up from 1 in 44 in 2018 and 1 in 150 in 2000. Autism is about 4 times more common in boys than girls, the CDC said. Monica Waltman, president of the South Dakota chapter of the Council of Administrators of Special Education and director of special services at Carrousel School in Box Elder, South Dakota, puts a visually supportive environment high on the list, noting that teachers often talk at students too much and forget that students learn visually, too. For example, when one teacher expressed frustration to her about a student who came into class, opened his computer and did not listen to directions, Waltman pointed out that the first line on the visual instructions at the front of the classroom read, “Get out your computer and log on.” She persuaded the teacher to change the directions to, “Sit down and listen to instructions.” And the student did so the very next day. Allred said that role-modeling and practicing real-life scenarios, regardless of academic content, can be very helpful to build students’ social skills and teach them to read social cues. Given that approximately 40% of students with autism don’t communicate in the traditional manner, she adds that teachers need to establish systems ranging from high-tech devices that help students get across their needs and wants to low-tech approaches where students simply point to something. The growth in tech devices sometimes causes educators to “pathologize students’ quirks,” Waltman said, adding that school is no longer the place to teach technology, because students are "digital natives." “The amount of time kids spend on technology does impede their ability to socially communicate,” especially for students with autism, given their tendency to fixate on preferences, Waltman said. Teachers also need to take into account students’ sensory needs, Allred said. “Bright lights can be challenging,” she said. “Offer a dimming light, or don’t have overhead lights on. Maybe lamps can be more supportive." She also recommends educators try to limit background noises or give space in a classroom that can be quieter and offer noise-canceling headphones. Family collaboration is another key element of working with children on the autism spectrum, Waltman said. That includes open communication to determine how the school day is impacting a student at home to make sure a student isn’t barely keeping composure during the day and then “losing it” at home. And teachers and school leaders shouldn’t stereotype autism as a “boy thing” and should be mindful that girls on the spectrum are more likely to “mask” their struggles, she said. Working with families is critically important, agrees Jamai Leigh, a special education teacher at REACH Academy, a special education-focused school in West Harrison, New York. “You have to build with parents,” she said. “A lot of parents are either in denial that their student has a disability, or they may not know how to ask the right questions to get those resources.” Schools need to have a range of learning settings and options for students with autism, including self-contained classrooms and paraprofessionals who can provide 1-to-1 supports, while still ensuring students with autism “feel like they are a part of the school community,” Leigh said. “And challenge them. Don’t think that because they don’t talk or may have some other disability, they’re not capable.” Students with autism require patience, compassion and genuineness, she said. “Leave everything at the door because they need all of you.”

2025-12-12 陈丽莹 教育资讯 英-中

The 43rd meeting of the Emergency Committee under the International Health Regulations (IHR or Regulations) on the international spread of poliovirus was convened by the WHO Director-General on 01 October 2025 with eight out of nine Committee members and the adviser meeting via video conference with affected countries, supported by the WHO Secretariat. The Emergency Committee reviewed the data on wild poliovirus (WPV1) and circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPV) in the context of the global target of interruption and certification of WPV1 eradication by 2027 and interruption and certification of cVDPV2 elimination by 2029. Technical updates were received about the situation in the following countries: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Germany, Israel, and Pakistan. The Committee reviewed detailed written updates on the situation in Afghanistan. Amendments to the IHR, adopted by the Seventy-seventh World Health Assembly, through resolution WHA77.17 in June 2024, entered into force on 19 September 2025 for 182 of 196 States Parties.[1] The 43rd meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on polioviruses, held on 01 October 2025, was the first under the amended Regulations. Key amendments to the IHR include, inter alia, broader poliovirus notification requirements; the introduction of the determination of “pandemic emergency”[2], a higher level of global public health alert with respect to a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC); measures to strengthen equitable access to relevant health products; and recognition of health documents in non-digital and digital formats. Since the last Emergency Committee meeting (18 June 2025), 15 new WPV1 cases have been reported from the two endemic countries, Afghanistan (2) and Pakistan (13). The cases in Afghanistan were reported from the South and East Regions of the country, while in Pakistan the cases were reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces. In 2025 (as of 17 September), 28 WPV1 cases have been reported: 4 in Afghanistan and 24 in Pakistan. This compares to 99 WPV1 cases reported in all of 2024. For environmental surveillance, a total of 443 WPV1 positive samples have been reported so far in 2025 (53 from Afghanistan and 390 from Pakistan), compared to 741 positive samples reported during all of 2024 (113 from Afghanistan and 628 from Pakistan). The Committee noted with concern the ongoing WPV1 transmission in both endemic countries, particularly along the southern (South Afghanistan – Quetta Block) and central (Northwest Pakistan/South KP – Southeast Afghanistan) cross-border epidemiological corridors. In Pakistan, WPV1 continues to be detected in environmental samples across all four major provinces. Transmission remains most intense in South Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), as indicated by continued reporting of WPV1 cases and positive environmental isolates. Although Karachi in Sindh Province has not reported any WPV1 cases in 2025, ongoing detections in environmental samples indicate continued transmission within the city. A decline in both WPV1 cases and environmental detections has been observed in the Quetta Block and Peshawar. Active WPV1 transmission is also being detected in 2025 in Lahore, Punjab Province, and several districts within the Central Pakistan epidemiological block. In Afghanistan, intense transmission continues in the southern region, detected through both acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and environmental surveillance. WPV1 transmission in Afghanistan’s eastern region has declined significantly in 2025, indicating improvement in population immunity levels. Regarding molecular epidemiology, there has been an overall decrease in genetic biodiversity between 2020 and 2023. However, an increase in the genetic biodiversity was observed in 2024, necessitating a split of two genetic clusters into eight genetic clusters, three of which are active in 2025. The remaining chains of transmission continue to circulate in populations and geographies with persistently low immunization coverage, including the bordering districts of the southern and northern epidemiological corridors across the two endemic countries. Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to implement an intensive and mostly synchronized campaign schedule, with a focus on achieving high vaccination coverage in core reservoirs and ensuring timely, effective response to WPV1 detections in other areas of each country. Afghanistan implemented two nationwide and three sub-national vaccination rounds while Pakistan implemented three nationwide and one sub-national vaccination during the first half of 2025. In Afghanistan, campaigns are being conducted using the site-to-site strategy, with focused efforts to strengthen operational and communication approaches to maximize coverage of target children under this modality. House-to-house campaigns are not being implemented since October 2024 due to security concerns, limiting full campaign access to all the children. The Committee expressed concern that site-to-site campaigns often fail to reach all children, particularly younger children, which could contribute to further geographic spread within Afghanistan and beyond. In Pakistan, the programme is facing challenges in consistently and effectively reaching all target children in South KP, the area currently experiencing the most intense WPV1 transmission in the country; more than 250 000 children remain unreached, primarily due to access constraints caused by insecurity. The Committee noted with appreciation the strong leadership and high-level commitment to polio eradication in Pakistan at all levels, including the direct engagement of the Prime Minister, the Federal Minister for Health, and the Prime Minister’s Focal Person for Polio Eradication. The Committee also acknowledged the consistently high reported coverage and Lot Quality Assurance Sampling (LQAS) pass rates at the national and provincial levels. However, the Committee observed variability in campaign quality at the district and sub-district levels, attributed to operational challenges and prevailing insecurity, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan provinces. The Committee also noted the continued detection of WPV1 in Karachi despite high reported vaccination coverage during recent campaigns. Stopping WPV1 transmission will require translating Pakistan’s strong political and programmatic commitment into high-quality implementation of vaccination plans, in line with the recommendations of the Technical Advisory Group, during the upcoming low-transmission season. Particular focus will be needed on core reservoirs and areas of persistent transmission. In addition to seasonal population movement within and between the two endemic countries, the ongoing return of undocumented migrants from Pakistan to Afghanistan continues to compound the programme’s operational challenges. This population displacement increases the risk of cross-border and internal poliovirus transmission in both countries. The Committee noted that this risk is being mitigated through vaccination at border crossing points and by updating micro-plans in areas of origin and return. The Committee also recognized the strong coordination mechanisms between the Afghanistan and Pakistan programmes at both national and subnational levels and encouraged the continuation of these collaborative efforts. It will be essential to maintain synchronized campaigns between Afghanistan and Pakistan and to achieve uniformly high vaccination coverage in border areas of both countries to interrupt WPV1 transmission in a comprehensive manner. In summary, available data indicate that global WPV1 transmission remains geographically confined to the two endemic countries. However, during 2024 and 2025, there has been geographic spread alongside continued transmission within core reservoir areas in both the endemic countries. In 2025, a total of 143 cVDPV cases have been reported (as of 17 September), 136 of which are cVDPV2, five are cVDPV3 and two are cVDPV1 cases. Additionally, 141 environmental samples have tested positive for cVDPV, including 11 cVDPV1, 121 cVDPV2 and nine environmental samples that tested positive for both cVDPV1 and cVDPV2. In 2024, a total of 463 cVDPV cases were reported, including 448 cVDPV2, 11 cVDPV1, and 4 cVDPV3 cases. During the same year, 291 environmental samples tested positive for cVDPV, 288 cVDPV2 and three cVDPV3. Since the last Emergency Committee meeting, new cVDPV1 outbreaks have been reported in Algeria, Djibouti, and Israel. Recently, Cameroon and Chad have reported cVDPV3 outbreaks, while the 2024 cVDPV3 outbreak in Guinea has continued into 2025. Nigeria and Chad in the Lake Chad Basin, along with Yemen and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, are the major contributors to the global cVDPV2 caseload in 2025. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, which previously experienced intense cVDPV2 transmission, have shown a significant decline in transmission intensity in 2025. However, challenges persist in ensuring operational quality and reaching all children during polio vaccination campaigns. A total of 20 circulating cVDPV2 emergence groups have been detected so far in 2025, compared to 31 in 2024, and 27 in 2023. Of the 20 emergence groups identified in 2025, five are newly detected this year: two derived from the novel OPV2 vaccine, while the origin of the other three is under investigation. Since its introduction in 2021, approximately 2 billion doses of nOPV2 have been administered and a total of 32 cVDPV2 emergences have been associated with nOPV2. The Committee noted that nOPV2 continues to demonstrate significantly greater genetic stability and a substantially lower risk of reversion to neurovirulence compared to Sabin OPV2. In 2025, two cVDPV1 cases have been reported to date, one each from Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo). In addition, cVDPV1 outbreaks have been confirmed in Djibouti and Israel, based on environmental surveillance detections (nine from Djibouti and ten from Israel). Cameroon and Chad reported co-circulation of type 2 and type 3 cVDPV in 2025. The same cVDPV3 emergence caused outbreaks in both countries, with one cVDPV3 case in Cameroon (paralysis onset in May 2025) and two in Chad (onsets in June and July 2025). The cVDPV3 outbreak in Guinea, first detected in 2024, has continued into 2025. In total, Guinea reported six cVDPV3 cases during 2024–2025. The Committee noted that although global transmission of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 remains at lower levels compared to cVDPV2, the upward trend observed in 2025 is a concern. This underscores the critical importance of sustaining high population immunity against type 1 and type 3 polioviruses through robust routine immunization, as well as ensuring timely and high-quality response activities in the event of any detections. The Committee noted that the risk of cVDPV outbreaks is largely driven by a combination of inaccessibility, insecurity, high concentrations of zero-dose and under-immunized children, and ongoing population displacement. The Committee unanimously concluded that the risk of international spread of poliovirus continues to constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and recommended extending the Temporary Recommendations for a further three months. The Committee, after a thorough review of the epidemiological and programmatic situation, unanimously concluded that the event does not constitute a pandemic emergency. In reaching the conclusion that the risk of international spread of poliovirus continues to constitute a PHEIC, the Committee considered the following factors: Ongoing risk of WPV1 international spread The Committee noted that the risk of international spread of WPV1 persists due to the following factors: Re-established and intense WPV1 transmission in the core reservoirs, particularly in the southern region of Afghanistan and Karachi and South KP in Pakistan. Geographical expansion and established transmission of WPV1 in epidemiologically critical areas, including Central Pakistan and parts of Punjab Province. Persistent inconsistencies in campaign quality and a substantial number of unimmunized and under-immunized children in some key areas, driven by access constraints due to insecurity (e.g. South KP), sub-optimal operational performance (e.g. site-to-site vaccination modality in Afghanistan and uneven quality in parts of Pakistan), and vaccine hesitancy in certain communities (e.g. South KP, Quetta Block, Southeast Afghanistan), all contributing to gaps in the population immunity. Ongoing population movement between the two endemic countries, including the returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan, leading to cross-border WPV1 transmission. Population movement from the two endemic countries to other neighbouring and distant countries, constituting risk of international spread. Ongoing risk of cVDPV international spread Based on the following factors, the risk of international spread of cVDPV appears to remain high: Continued cVDPV2 transmission in Lake Chad Basin, particularly in high-risk areas of Nigeria, with continued potential for amplification of spread. Intense cVDPV2 transmission in the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa countries continue to experience overlapping humanitarian and health emergencies, making it challenging to implement high-quality vaccination campaigns in a timely manner. A large pool of unimmunized and susceptible children in the northern governorates of Yemen, where a proper OPV response to the ongoing cVDPV2 outbreak has not yet been implemented due to insecurity and lack of access. Challenges also persist regarding timely shipment of AFP stool specimens from these areas. Full access to all children in southern and central Somalia also remains a significant challenge. A widening gap in intestinal mucosal immunity among young children since the global withdrawal of OPV2 in 2016, as well as high concentration of zero dose children in certain areas. New cVDPV1 outbreaks in Algeria, Djibouti, and Israel, and cVDPV3 outbreaks in Cameroon, Chad and Guinea indicate continued low routine immunization and IPV coverage in several countries and associated immunity gap. The risk of new and expanding cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks appears to have increased in 2025. Ongoing cross-border transmission, including spread into newly re-infected countries and territories — with Cameroon and Chad reporting new cVDPV3 outbreaks, and Algeria, Djibouti, and Israel reporting new cVDPV1 outbreaks. Additional contributing factors include: Sub-optimal routine immunization: Many countries have weak immunization systems that can be further impacted by humanitarian emergencies including conflict and protracted complex emergencies. This growing vulnerability leaves populations in fragile states at increased risk of polio outbreaks. Ongoing insecurity and conflict in several areas that serve as persistent source of cVDPV transmission. Lack of access: Inaccessibility remains a major risk, particularly in northern Yemen and Somalia, where sizable populations have remained unreached with polio vaccine for extended periods of more than a year. The current resource-constrained environment further challenges the full and effective implementation of critical eradication activities. The Committee provided the Director-General with the following advice aimed at reducing the risk of international spread of WPV1 and cVDPVs, based on the risk stratification as follows: States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3. States infected with cVDPV2, with or without evidence of local transmission. States previously infected by WPV1 or cVDPV within the last 24 months (last detection > 13 months). Criteria to assess States as no longer infected by WPV1 or cVDPV: Poliovirus Case: 12 months after the date of onset of the most recent case PLUS one month to account for case detection, investigation, laboratory testing and reporting period OR when all reported AFP cases with onset within 12 months of last case have been tested for polio and excluded for WPV1 or cVDPV, and environmental or other samples collected within 12 months of the last case have also tested negative, whichever is the longer. Environmental or other isolation of WPV1 or cVDPV (no poliovirus case): 12 months after collection of the most recent positive environmental or other sample (such as from a healthy child) PLUS one month to account for the laboratory testing and reporting period. These criteria may be varied for the WPV1 endemic countries and countries with longstanding persistent polio outbreaks, where more rigorous assessment is needed in reference to surveillance quality. Once a country meets these criteria as no longer infected, the country will remain on a ‘watch list’ for a further 12 months as a period of heightened monitoring. After this period, the country will no longer be subject to Temporary Recommendations. States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 with potential risk of international spread (as of data available at WHO HQ on 04 June 2025) WPV1 Afghanistan most recent detection 24 Aug 2025 Pakistan most recent detection 07 Aug 2025 cVDPV1 Algeria most recent detection 17 Mar 2025 DR Congo most recent detection 25 Jun 2025 Djibouti most recent detection 04 May 2025 Israel most recent detection 09 Jul 2025 cVDPV3 Cameroon most recent detection 30 May 2025 Chad most recent detection 22 Jul 2025 Guinea most recent detection 07 Mar 2025 These countries should: Officially declare, if not already done, at the level of head of state or government, that the interruption of poliovirus transmission is a national public health emergency and implement all required measures to support polio eradication; where such declaration has already been made, this emergency status should be maintained as long as the response is required. Ensure that all residents and long­term visitors (> four weeks) of all ages, receive a dose of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) between four weeks and 12 months prior to international travel. Ensure that those undertaking urgent travel (within four weeks), who have not received a dose of bOPV or IPV in the previous four weeks to 12 months, receive a dose of polio vaccine at least by the time of departure as this will still provide benefit, particularly for frequent travelers. Ensure that such travelers are provided with an International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis in accordance with the Model International Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis (ICVP), contained in Annex 6 of the IHR to record their polio vaccination and serve as proof of vaccination. It is noted that, in accordance with resolution WHA77.17, ICVP issued after 19 September 2025 (date of entry into force of the amendments) by States Parties to which the amendments apply shall conform to the amended Model ICVP contained in Annex 6. Restrict at the point of departure the international travel of any resident lacking documentation of appropriate polio vaccination. These recommendations apply to international travelers from all points of departure, irrespective of the means of transport (road, air and/or sea). Further enhance cross­border efforts by significantly improving coordination at the national, regional, and local levels to substantially increase vaccination coverage of travelers crossing the border and of high risk cross­border populations. Improved coordination of cross­border efforts should include closer supervision and monitoring of the quality of vaccination at border transit points, as well as tracking of the proportion of travelers that are identified as unvaccinated after they have crossed the border. Further intensify efforts to increase routine immunization coverage, including sharing coverage data, as high routine immunization coverage is an essential element of the polio eradication strategy, particularly as the world moves closer to eradication. Countries which have not yet introduced a second dose of IPV into their routine immunization schedules should urgently implement this. Once available, countries should also consider introducing the hexavalent vaccine, now approved by Gavi. Ensure a high-quality surveillance network that provides equitable coverage of all populations, enabling timely detection of new poliovirus isolates and effective monitoring and response to evolving epidemiological trends. Ensure that both routine and supplementary immunization activities reach all geographies and populations equitably, aiming to achieve uniformly high population immunity and protect all children from poliovirus paralysis. The GPEI and other relevant international health partners should support countries in ensuring fair and timely access to recommended polio vaccines through established global mechanisms. Maintain these measures until the following criteria have been met: (i) at least six months have passed without new infections and (ii) there is documentation of full application of high-quality eradication activities in all infected and high-risk areas; in the absence of such documentation these measures should be maintained until the state meets the above assessment criteria for being no longer infected. Provide to the Director-General a regular report on the implementation of the Temporary Recommendations on international travel. States infected with cVDPV2, with or without evidence of local transmission: (as of data available at WHO HQ on 17 September 2025) Algeria most recent detection 21 Jul 2025 Angola most recent detection 17 Jul 2025 Benin most recent detection 12 Jun 2025 Burkina Faso most recent detection 30 Mar 2025 Cameroon most recent detection 07 Apr 2025 Central African Republic most recent detection 21 Jun 2025 Chad most recent detection 05 Aug 2025 Côte d’Ivoire most recent detection 06 Feb 2025 Democratic Republic of the Congo most recent detection 16 May 2025 Djibouti most recent detection 04 May 2025 Ethiopia most recent detection 05 Jun 2025 Finland most recent detection 19 Nov 2024 Germany most recent detection 28 Jul 2025 Ghana most recent detection 20 Aug 2024 Israel most recent detection 11 Feb 2025 Niger most recent detection 18 Apr 2025 Nigeria most recent detection 24 Jul 2025 occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) most recent detection 05 Mar 2025 Papua New Guinea most recent detection 11 Jul 2025 Poland most recent detection 21 Jan 2025 Senegal most recent detection 05 Mar 2025 Somalia most recent detection 04 Aug 2025 South Sudan most recent detection 03 Dec 2024 Spain most recent detection 16 Sep 2024 Sudan most recent detection 16 Apr 2025 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland most recent detection 20 Jan 2025 United Republic of Tanzania most recent detection 18 Aug 2025 Yemen most recent detection 27 Jul 2025 States that have had an importation of cVDPV2 but without evidence of local transmission should: Officially declare, if not already done, at the level of head of state or government, that the prevention or interruption of poliovirus transmission is a national public health emergency. Undertake urgent and intensive investigations and risk assessment to determine if there has been local transmission of the imported cVDPV2, requiring an immunization response. Noting the existence of a separate mechanism for responding to type 2 poliovirus infections, Members States should request vaccines from the global novel OPV2 stockpile. Further intensify efforts to increase routine immunization coverage, as high routine immunization coverage is an essential element of the polio eradication strategy, particularly as the world moves closer to eradication. Countries which have not yet introduced a second dose of IPV into their routine immunization schedules should urgently implement this. Once available, countries should also consider introducing the hexavalent vaccine, now approved by Gavi. Intensify surveillance for polioviruses and strengthen regional cooperation and cross-border coordination to ensure the timely detection of poliovirus. Ensure a high-quality surveillance network that provides equitable coverage of all populations, enabling timely detection of new poliovirus isolates and effective monitoring and response to evolving epidemiological trends. Ensure that both routine and supplementary immunization activities reach all geographies and populations equitably, aiming to achieve uniformly high population immunity and protect all children from poliovirus paralysis. The GPEI and other relevant international health partners should support countries in ensuring fair and timely access to recommended polio vaccines through established global mechanisms. States with local transmission of cVDPV2, with risk of international spread, in addition to the above measures, should: Encourage residents and long­term visitors (> four weeks) to receive a dose of IPV four weeks to 12 months prior to international travel. Ensure that travelers who receive such vaccination have access to an appropriate document to record their polio vaccination status. Intensify regional cooperation and cross­border coordination to enhance surveillance for prompt detection of poliovirus, and vaccinate refugees, travelers and cross­border populations. For both sub-categories: Maintain these measures until the following criteria have been met: (i) at least six months have passed without the detection of circulation of VDPV2 in the country from any source, and (ii) there is documentation of full application of high quality eradication activities in all infected and high risk areas; in the absence of such documentation these measures should be maintained until the state meets the criteria of a ‘state no longer infected’. At the end of 12 months without evidence of transmission, provide a report to the Director-General on measures taken to implement the Temporary Recommendations. Provide to the Director-General a regular report on the implementation of the Temporary Recommendations. States no longer polio infected, but previously infected by WPV1 or cVDPV within the last 24 months(as of data available at WHO HQ on 17 September 2025) WPV1 country last virus date cVDPV country last virus date Egypt cVDPV2 01 Aug 2024 Equatorial Guinea cVDPV2 26 Mar 2024 France (French Guiana) cVDPV3 06 Aug 2024 Gambia cVDPV2 15 Feb 2024 Guinea cVDPV2 12 Jun 2024 Indonesia cVDPV2 10 Jul 2024 Kenya cVDPV2 31 Jul 2024 Liberia cVDPV2 08 Jun 2024 Mali cVDPV2 02 Jan 2024 Mauritania cVDPV2 13 Dec 2023 Mozambique cVDPV1 17 May 2024 Sierra Leone cVDPV2 28 May 2024 Republic of Congo cVDPV2 07 Dec 2023 Uganda cVDPV2 07 May 2024 Zimbabwe cVDPV2 25 Jun 2024 These countries should: Urgently strengthen routine immunization to boost/maintain population immunity. Enhance surveillance quality, including considering introducing or expanding supplementary methods such as environmental surveillance, to reduce the risk of undetected WPV1 and cVDPV transmission, particularly among high-risk and vulnerable populations. Intensify efforts to ensure vaccination of mobile and cross­border populations, Internally Displaced Persons, refugees, and other vulnerable groups. Enhance regional cooperation and cross border coordination to ensure prompt detection of WPV1 and cVDPV, and vaccination of high-risk population groups. Maintain these measures with documentation of full application of high-quality surveillance and vaccination activities. The Committee noted that the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has developed an Action Plan aimed at sustaining and enhancing programme operations to achieve the goals of the GPEI Strategy, within the limits of available resources. The Committee appreciated the comprehensive and consultative process undertaken by the GPEI in formulating the plan. However, the Committee expressed concern that the current financial shortfall, estimated at nearly 30%, poses a significant risk to all components of the programme, including the ability to maintain sensitive poliovirus surveillance. These risks are further compounded by concurrent funding constraints across WHO, international partners, and national governments, reflecting wider fiscal pressures across the global health landscape. The Committee therefore urged donor countries and partner organizations to strengthen their financial support, emphasizing that the consequences of underfunding could be substantial and far-reaching. The Committee also called on national governments to prioritize polio eradication within their domestic frame mechanisms to safeguard the gains made and sustain progress toward global eradication. The Committee emphasized the critical importance of robust monitoring of the implementation of the GPEI Action Plan to enable early identification and timely mitigation of emerging risks and gaps. This monitoring should comprehensively cover all programme components, including immunization activities as well as field and laboratory surveillance. The Committee noted that WPV1 transmission has persisted with a generally high force of infection in the two endemic countries during the high transmission season. While transmission remains widespread, it continues to be driven by core reservoirs and persistent transmission zones—particularly South Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi in Pakistan, and the Southern Region of Afghanistan. The Committee recognized that the current momentum of the Pakistan programme, together with the forthcoming low transmission season, presents a critical opportunity to interrupt WPV1 transmission during the first half of 2026. Achieving this goal will depend heavily on progress in South Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Karachi, and Southern Afghanistan. The Committee urged the Afghanistan polio programme to explore feasible options for transitioning to house-to-house vaccination, noting that site-to-site campaigns have not yet achieved the level of coverage and quality required for eradication. The Committee emphasized the need for a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach in both endemic countries, extending to the district level, to achieve the quality required in polio eradication activities to stop WPV1 transmission. Such an approach is more critical than ever to sustain global confidence and continued support for the polio eradication effort. The Committee noted the continued transmission of cVDPV2 in the African Region, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa. While the overall number of cVDPV2 cases has declined over the past two years, the Committee expressed concern about ongoing transmission in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Although Nigeria has recently reported a decrease in cVDPV2 cases, transmission persists in several critical areas, posing a risk to the progress achieved elsewhere in the country. In Somalia, a downward trend in cVDPV2 detections appears to be emerging; however, given the persistent challenges in accessing children in south and central Somalia, this must be interpreted with caution, and heightened vigilance must be maintained. The Committee also acknowledged the ongoing difficulties in implementing immunization responses in the northern governorates of Yemen, where cVDPV2 transmission continues. The Committee noted the initiation of vaccination activities in response to the cVDPV2 outbreak in Papua New Guinea. Given the very low population immunity against type 2 poliovirus, the Committee emphasized the need to ensure high-quality implementation of the vaccination response. The Committee stressed that urgent measures are required to strengthen surveillance, including addressing silent areas for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, to minimize the risk of undetected cVDPV2 circulation and to effectively monitor progress. Although the risk of international spread of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 is considerably lower than that of cVDPV2, the Committee expressed concern over the recent cVDPV1 outbreaks in Algeria, Djibouti, and Israel, and the cVDPV3 outbreaks in Cameroon, Chad, and Guinea, which warrant continued vigilance. These outbreaks highlight the existence of population pockets with low immunity to type 1 and type 3 polioviruses and underscore the need to strengthen routine immunization. The Committee recommended ensuring high-quality response to these outbreaks to prevent further geographical spread. The Committee noted that many countries affected by cVDPV continue to experience conflict and insecurity, disrupting both routine immunization services and polio vaccination campaigns. The Committee also noted that concurrent health emergencies and disease outbreaks in several countries further complicate the timely and effective implementation of vaccination response. Acknowledging the diverse and often complex operating environments at national and sub-national levels, the Committee emphasized the importance of context-specific operational and social mobilization interventions to ensure high-quality campaign delivery and ultimately interrupt cVDPV transmission. The Committee also highlighted the need for coordinated sub-regional strategies and strengthened cross-border collaboration to overcome challenges posed by porous borders and shared operational constraints across the polio outbreak affected countries. The Committee noted the continued cross-border spread of cVDPV2 in the African and Eastern Mediterranean Regions, the detection of cVDPV2 in multiple countries of the European Region, and the detection of cVDPV2 in Papua New Guinea linked to the 2024 transmission in Indonesia. The Committee also noted the shared cVDPV3 transmission in Chad and Cameroon. These developments underscore that polio remains a global threat until eradication is fully achieved. The Committee emphasized the critical importance of maintaining sensitive surveillance systems in polio-affected and high-risk countries and recommended that the GPEI provide all necessary support under the Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan. The Committee underscored the importance of preserving the capacity of the Global Polio Laboratory Network to continue supporting eradication efforts through timely and accurate detection of polioviruses. The Committee noted the need for high-income countries to sustain high-quality poliovirus surveillance, given the persistent risk of importation, as recently demonstrated by detections in the European Region. Robust surveillance remains essential for early detection and timely response to both importations and newly emerging outbreaks. The Committee recommended that programme messaging on the international spread of polioviruses be tailored to the specific context and setting, including ensuring appropriate communication in high-income countries, with the aim of fostering understanding and sustained support for global polio eradication efforts. The Committee recognized the critical role that mobile and migrant populations play in sustaining WPV1 transmission in endemic countries, as well as cVDPV transmission in the African Region and globally. The Committee urged that vaccinating populations on the move be treated as a top priority, emphasizing the importance of identifying different categories of mobile populations such as seasonal, economic, and agricultural migrants, and reaching them through country-specific, tailored strategies and approaches. The Committee noted that novel OPV2 continues to demonstrate greater genetic stability compared to Sabin OPV2. However, the risk of new cVDPV2 emergences increases when the interval between outbreak response campaigns exceeds four weeks or when vaccination quality is suboptimal, underscoring the need for timely and high-quality immunization efforts. The Committee noted that the amendments to the IHR, adopted by the Seventy-seventh World Health Assembly through resolution WHA77.17, entered into force on 19 September 2025 for 182 of the 196 States Parties. The Committee took the amended International Health Regulations into account during its deliberations and in reviewing and advising on the Temporary Recommendations. Based on the current situation regarding WPV1 and cVDPVs, and the reports provided by affected countries, the Director-General accepted the Committee’s assessment, and on 10 November 2025 determined that the poliovirus situation continues to constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) with respect to WPV1 and cVDPV. The poliovirus situation, however, does not constitute a pandemic emergency. The Director-General endorsed the Committee’s recommendations for countries meeting the definition for ‘States infected with WPV1, cVDPV1 or cVDPV3 with potential risk for international spread’, ‘States infected with cVDPV2 with potential risk for international spread’ and for ‘States previously infected by WPV1 or cVDPV within the last 24 months’ and extended the Temporary Recommendations under the IHR to reduce the risk of the international spread of poliovirus, effective, 10 November 2025. -------- [1] The text of the International Health Regulations (2005), as amended in 2014, 2022 and 2024 is available at https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf [accessed on 21 October 2025]. [2] Under amended Article 1 of the IHR, “pandemic emergency” is defined as “a public health emergency of international concern that is caused by a communicable disease and: (i) has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple States; and (ii) is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those States; and (iii) is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and (iv) requires rapid, equitable and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of government and whole-of-society approaches.

2025-12-12 黎扬静 医学 英-中

中国民航网 通讯员王振同 报道:11月11日,东航甘肃分公司组织了以“全民消防、生命至上——安全用火用电”为主题的消防安全培训及应急处置演练。 在全国消防宣传月之际,为全面强化全员消防安全意识,提升火灾应急处置和协同救援能力,特邀甘肃省专业培训机构消防宣讲员授课,聚焦高层(老旧)建筑防火、动火用电规范、日常火灾预防及应急处置核心技能,通过理论讲解、案例分析等方式,为参训人员普及消防安全知识,夯实安全理论基础。 实战演练模拟12楼综管部办公室突发火情,现场办公人员组成第一波次应急处置小组迅速响应,义务消防员组成的第二批次救援力量3分钟内抵达现场开展初起火情扑救。兰州新区消防救援支队接到报警后快速驰援,成功扑灭火源。同时,分公司航卫工作人员第一时间对模拟受伤人员进行初步救治,并及时联系“120”送医就诊,整套流程衔接顺畅、处置规范。 (东航甘肃分公司供图) 此次活动以“培训+演练”的形式,既强化了全员消防安全意识和应急技能,也提升了跨单位、跨部门协同救援能力,为公司安全生产和群众平安出行提供了坚实保障。分公司将常态化开展消防安全教育及应急演练,不断完善应急处置机制,以实际行动筑牢消防安全底线。 甘肃实业、甘肃航食、兰州物流、甘肃智运与分公司各单位安全工作分管领导、消防管理员、义务消防员、新入职员工84人共同参加。(编辑:张彤 校对:张薇 审核:韩磊)

2025-12-12 李正苗 交通运输 中-英

This article was originally published at The Conversation. The publication contributed the article to Space.com's Expert Voices: Op-Ed & Insights. As I walked out onto the frozen Arctic water off Utqiagvik, Alaska, for the first time, I was mesmerized by the icescape. Piles of blue and white sea-ice rubble several feet high gave way to flat areas and then rubble again. The snow atop it, sometimes several feet deep, hides gaps among the blocks of sea ice, as I found out when one of my legs suddenly disappeared through the snow. As a polar climate scientist, I have focused on Arctic sea ice for over a decade. But spending time on the ice with people who rely on it for their way of life provides a different perspective. Local hunters run snowmobiles over the sea ice to reach the whales and seals they rely on for traditional food. They talked about how they know when the sea ice is safe to travel on, and how that's changing as global temperatures rise. They described worsening coastal erosion as the protective ice disappears earlier and forms later. On land, they're contending with thawing permafrost that causes roads and buildings to sink. Their experiences echo the data I have been working with from satellites and climate models. Most winters, sea ice covers the entire surface of the Arctic Ocean basin, even extending into the northern North Atlantic and North Pacific. Even in late summer, sea ice used to cover about half the Arctic Ocean. However, the late summer ice has declined by about 50% since routine satellite observations began in 1978. This decline of summer sea ice area has a multitude of effects, from changing local ecosystems to allowing more shipping through the Arctic Ocean. It also enhances global warming, because the loss of the reflective white sea-ice surface leaves dark open water that absorbs the sun's radiation, adding more heat to the system. Along the Alaskan coast, the decline of the Arctic sea ice cover is most apparent in the longer ice-free season. Sea ice is forming later in the fall now than it used to and breaking up earlier in the spring. For people who live there, this means shorter seasons when the ice is safe to travel over, and less time when sea ice is present to protect the coastline from ocean waves. Open water increases the risk of coastal erosion, particularly when accompanied by thawing permafrost, stronger storms and rising sea level. All are driven by greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, particularly burning fossil fuels. In some places along the Alaskan coast, erosion threatens roads, houses and entire communities. Research has shown that coastal erosion in Alaska has accelerated over recent decades. More weeks of open water also affect animals. Polar bears spend the summer on land but require sea ice to hunt their preferred food, seals. The longer the sea ice stays away from land, the longer polar bears are deprived of this high-fat food, which can ultimately threaten the bears' survival. Across the Arctic, satellite data has captured how sea ice has been thinning and getting younger. As recently as the late 1970s, about 60% of the Arctic sea ice was at least 1 year old and generally thicker than younger ice. Today, the amount of ice more than a year old is down to about 35%. Local residents experience that change in another way: Multiyear sea ice is much less salty than new sea ice. Hunters used to cut blocks of multiyear sea ice to get drinking water, but that older ice has become harder to find. Sea ice forms from ocean water, which is salty. As the water freezes, the salt collects in between the ice crystals. Because the higher the salt content, the lower the freezing point of the water, these enclosures in the sea ice contain salty liquid water, called brine. This brine drains out of the sea ice over time through small channels in the ice. Thus, multiyear sea ice, which has survived at least one melt cycle, is less salty than first-year sea ice. Since the coastal landfast sea ice around Utqiagvik no longer contains much multiyear sea ice, if any, the hunters now have to take a block of lake ice or simply gallon jugs of water with them if they plan to stay on the ice for several days. As long as greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, Arctic sea ice will generally continue to decline, studies show. One study calculated that, statistically, the average carbon dioxide emissions per person per year in the U.S. led to the disappearance of an area of summer sea ice the size of a large hotel room – 430 to 538 square feet (40 to 50 square meters) each year. Today, when Arctic sea ice is at its minimum extent, at the end of summer, it covers only about half what it covered in 1979 at that time of the year. The Arctic still has around 1.8 million square miles (4.6 million square kilometers) of sea ice that survives the summer melt, approximately equal to the area of the entire European Union. Climate models show the Arctic could be ice-free at the end of summer within decades, depending on how quickly humans rein in greenhouse gas emissions. While a win for accessibility of shipping routes through the Arctic in summer, studies suggest that the large reduction of sea ice would bring profound ecological changes in the Arctic Ocean, as more light and heat enter the ocean surface. The warmer the surface ocean water is, the longer it will take for the ocean to cool back down to the freezing point in the fall, delaying the formation of new sea ice. Arctic sea ice will continue to form in winter for the next several decades. The months of no sunlight mean it will continue to get very cold in winter, allowing sea ice to form. Climate models have estimated that it would take extremely high atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations to warm the climate enough for no sea ice to form in the winter in the Arctic Ocean – close to 2,000 parts per million, more than 4.5 times our current level. However, winter sea ice will cover less area as the Earth warms. For people living along the Arctic Ocean coast in Alaska, winter ice will still return for now. If global greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced, though, climate models show that even winter sea ice along the Alaskan coast could disappear by the end of the 21st century. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

2025-12-12 余金玲 航空 英-中

机车车辆整修有序推进 筑牢秋冬运输安全防线 连日来,全路机辆系统紧盯走行部、制动系统、高压系统、油电防火等质量安全关键,结合运用实际情况,针对性开展机车车辆秋季整修,全面恢复设备良好质量状态,同步做好冬季防寒准备,当前各项整修任务即将全面完成。 今年暑运期间,客货运量均创历史同期新高。暑运结束后,中国国家铁路集团有限公司机辆部及时发布机车车辆秋季整修工作通知,明确整修标准、整修重点及组织实施要求,组织各铁路局集团公司统筹推进机车、动集动力车与动客车整修工作,严格整修过程管控,定期掌握整修进度和处理的典型故障情况,加强整修计划和标准落实情况的监督检查,对整修后的运用质量进行跟踪分析,专题组织进京、进沪、进穗“三进”客车和动力集中动车组整修质量鉴定抽查。 各铁路局集团公司结合实际,细化整修方案、编制整修计划,强化过程卡控和结果验收,实行“记名检、记名修”,确保整修工作取得实效。中国铁路武汉局集团有限公司武昌南机务段对配属机车进行全面“把脉问诊”,精准消除机车质量隐患;中国铁路成都局集团有限公司重庆车辆段制订“一车型一方案”整修计划,分车型、分专业、分部件开展动客车整修工作;中国铁路乌鲁木齐局集团有限公司库尔勒机务段成立专项整修小组,对配属的机车进行专项整修,不断提升机车设备质量,为疆煤外运提供坚实可靠的运力保障;中国铁路北京局集团有限公司结合季节性特点,细化动车组防寒整备项点,确保机车冬季“温暖上线”。(来源:中国国家铁路集团有限公司官网)

2025-12-12 宁晓敏 交通运输 中-英

When the gibbous moon hits your eye like a big glowing orb ... you know you're in the Andes Mountains. This full moon was recently captured by Petr Horálek of NOIRLab in the Atacama Desert in Chile, where important astronomical observatories like the Very Large Telescope (VLT) and Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter Array (ALMA) reside. A gibbous moon, like the one captured here, refers to a phase in which the moon is more than half illuminated but not yet full, or just after full, when it's starting to wane. This phase is important because it represents one of the moon's brightest periods, offering extended natural light at night. For astronomers and stargazers, the gibbous phase provides excellent visibility for spotting lunar craters and highlands, while for ancient peoples and modern observers alike, it has long symbolized growth, transition and the fullness of cycles. This photo was taken at Cerro Pachón, a mountain in Chile's Atacama Desert. Thanks to the excess glow from the gibbous phase, moongazers can see dark splotches, or maria, across the surface of our moon. These maria were created when the moon had active volcanoes. Two very specific and important maria can be seen in this image: Mare Tranquillitatis (above left of center) and Mare Serenitatis (left of the moon's center). Both of these sites are part of humanity's rich legacy of visiting the moon. You can learn more about moon landings and other features of the moon.

2025-12-11 欧晓霖 航空 英-中

An aerial drone photo taken on Dec. 25, 2024 shows a view of the standard-gage yard of Horgos railway port in Horgos, northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. (Xinhua/Chen Shuo) Horgos Port in northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has become China's largest land port for commercial vehicle exports, having shipped more than 300,000 units so far this year, Urumqi Customs said on Friday. In the first three quarters of this year, Xinjiang's foreign trade value reached 393.14 billion yuan (about 55.4 billion U.S. dollars) -- a year-on-year surge of 22.1 percent, reflecting a steady upward growth trend, the customs office said. The port's success is part of a broader trend where private enterprises in Xinjiang have significantly boosted their activity, now accounting for 98 percent of foreign trade growth, with 3,629 such firms actively engaged, said Li Qinghua, vice commissioner of Urumqi Customs. Notable export sectors include household appliances, lighting equipment, and vehicles and auto parts -- all reporting strong performance, Li added. Xinjiang's trade with Belt and Road Initiative partner countries surged 14.2 percent year on year to 341.49 billion yuan in the first three quarters, with Central Asian nations remaining its top trading partners, accounting for 215.73 billion yuan collectively. Li emphasized that future efforts will focus on establishing the core Silk Road Economic Belt area, enhancing regulatory efficiency, and empowering enterprises to drive high-quality foreign trade development.

2025-12-11 林小慧 时政 英-中

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